

Conference
“14th Day on Computational Game Theory”

March 7-8, 2024

organized by
Thomas Kesselheim, Laura Vargas Koch

• Thursday, March 7

13:00 - 13:20	<i>Selfregistration</i>
13:20 - 13:30	<i>Welcome</i>
13:30 - 14:15	Michal Feldman Ambiguous contracts
14:15 - 14:30	Miriam Fischer Fair Interventions in Weighted Congestion Games
14:33 - 14:48	Julian Schwarz Tolls for Dynamic Equilibrium Flows
14:51 - 15:06	Simon Krogmann Two-Stage Facility Location with Atomic Clients
15:10 - 15:40	Short Talks
15:40 - 16:45	<i>Poster Session and Coffee Break</i>
16:45 - 17:00	Stephen Raach Dynamic Pricing in Weighted Uniform Matroid Market
17:03 - 17:18	Simon Finster Equitable Pricing in Auctions
17:21 - 17:36	Johannes Hahn The Discrete Myerson Auction: an LP Perspective
17:39 - 17:54	Golnoosh Shahkarami Learning Augmented Mechanism Design
19:00	<i>Dinner</i> <i>Sion im Carré, Bonn</i>

• **Friday, March 8**

09:00 - 09:45	László A. Végh Approximating Competitive Equilibrium by Nash Welfare
09:45 - 10:00	Conrad Schecker Contract Design for Pandora's Box
10:03 - 10:18	Lisa Wilhelmi Algorithms for Claims Trading
10:21 - 10:36	Tolga Tel Persuading Agents in Opinion Formation Games
10:40 - 11:15	<i>Coffee Break</i>
11:15 - 11:30	Alireza Amanihamedani Spatial matching under resource competition
11:33 - 11:48	Javier Cembrano Impartial Rank Aggregation
11:51 - 12:06	Andrei Constantinescu Stable Seating Arrangements (Best Paper WINE 2023)
12:09 - 12:24	Antonia Ellerbrock Cost Allocation for Set Covering
12:30 - 13:45	<i>Lunch</i>
13:45 - 14:00	Martin Knaack Improved Bounds for Selfish Knapsack
14:03 - 14:18	Jie Liu Interconnections between properties of NE
14:21 - 14:36	Michael Markl Computing User Equilibria for Schedule-Based Transit Networks
Cancellation due to the strike	Sai Ganesh Nagarajan Learning/Last Iterate Convergence
14:40 - 14:50	<i>Good-Bye</i>